About Alterity, Ethics and Nothingness: musings from Elsewhere

 Levinas's anti-Hegelianism and his relentless critique of the Hegelian ontological pursuit of the Spirit are insights that merit thorough considerations from the ethical and existentialist perspectives.
Why?
It is plausible to state that Levinas's thoughts emit Sartrean undertones, specifically, when they deal with the existent (without the pre-conceptualization of the Other; this aligns with Sartre's notion of existence precedes essence) concept as a state prior to ontological definitions (essence). This is understood in its conceptualization of alterity, which, in its function infers the disruption of the dialectical modus operandi involving I and the Other (aufhebung).
Thus, theoretically, the starting point of Levinas’s argument alludes to a variant of the Nothingness, since it is posited before the encounter with the Other and, thus, before the essence. It works in the fashion that “I can’t recognize you as the Other, precisely because I have not objectified your essences in order to assess what makes you different from me”. The I and the Other become relative and non-binary, therefore, the relationship between the I and the Other avoids an ontological classification. It puts the dialectics of ontology and phenomenology at a standstill.  

This explains that Levina’s work is grounded on the idea that the Other’s face is not recognized as the Other; this is a state where the preconception of the Other as such, is inexistent. However, it can be argued that Levinas’s thought moves along an existentialist bent, for his anti-ontology stance (where the I is not defined by the Other gaze, but by the mutual face to face, the encounter that leads to the ethical understanding, the epiphany) not only does it infers a non-ontological Nothingness, but it also falls on the need for an eventual recognition. 

But what kind of recognition? For the same? For the other? Semantically, the perception of the Alterity, already presupposes a recognition of the difference, although it desists an ontological codification, Alterity can be grounded on a form of nothingness.
But is nothingness a condition of Ethics?
Ethics itself presupposes the recognition of the Other; an ontological identity is the condition required for Ethical apprehension/conception/consideration ...Problematic, right? Nevertheless, there is a variant of Ethics within Nothingness, and Levinas cannot escape from the realm and sense of Nothingness, which is inherent to his thought. 

Considering that Ontology is only possible via the I and Other dialectic (set fort by Language and/or negativity/phenomenological perception), and the Levinean argument that ontological definitions imply a violence on the Other, then, can we say that Nothingness is pure Ethics? That is, if we understand that Nothingness (non essence; the babble; before the intelligibility of the sign) is the spatial temporal zone where the I has yet to be defined ontologically; it cannot cause nor harbor violence, since there is no discourse nor language to set forth such, then, in consideration with all possible articulations involving Existentialism and Alterity, philosophically, it can be argued that existential Nothingness is pure Ethics, as it lingers before the ontological recognition, the violence on the Other.